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Das Papier behandelt Modellierungsfragen und Datenprobleme bezüglich der Zweckmäßig-
keit sog. risk-assessment-Modelle bzw. zur Klärung von Frühwarnmodellen. Zunächst wird 
generell die Datenlage überprüft. Dabei läßt sich argumentieren, daß zwei Typen von Daten 
im Mittelpunkt stehen: einerseits Daten, die zur Erklärung des Auftretens und der Eskalation 
von gewaltsamen Konflikten herangezogen werden können, andererseits Daten, die sich für 
die Fundierung von risk-assessment-Modellen eignen. Während beim ersten Typus vor allem 
ein eklatanter Mangel bezüglich innerstaatlicher Konflikte herrscht, sind wir beim zweiten 
Typ mit dem Problem konfrontiert, daß das Generieren von immer neuen Daten solange ein 
wirkungsloses Unterfangen bleiben wird, wie es nicht mehr theoretische Klarheit über die 
Prozeß- und Strukturbedingungen von Gewalt gibt. Anschließend werden noch zentrale 
Modelle überprüft, die sich mit dem risk-assessment und der Frühwarnung befassen. Es wird 
gezeigt, daß – mit Ausnahme von Korrelationsmodellierungen – noch immer zuwenig Arbeit 







This paper addresses model design and data-related issues pertaining to the use of risk 
assessment models in support of conflict early warning systems. The paper first examines the 
data needed for risk assessment models. It argues that there are actually two types of data that 
we must collect and use: data to determine the theories that best explain the outbreak or 
escalation of violent conflict and data corresponding to variables that have been demonstrated 
to have predictive power and thus are appropriate for use in a risk assessment model. With 
respect to intrastate conflicts there remains a dearth of data of the first type that is only slowly 
being corrected. Collecting data of the second type will continue to be an inefficient process 
until better theories have been formulated and tested with the first type of data. The paper 
then examines a number of models germane to risk assessment and conflict early warning. It 
finds that except for one class of models, so-called correlational models, there has been only 
limited work done even though the alternatives appear to have promise.  
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The goal of achieving useable risk assessment models and early warning systems for 
violent conflicts has reemerged in recent years.1 Growing awareness that early intervention 
may have prevented or at least mitigated disasters such as Rwanda or Somalia has motivated 
governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to improve 
their ability to get an early warning that a violent conflict, with its attendant humanitarian 
relief demands, is about to erupt (Chayes and Chayes, 1996). Those organizations with 
responsibilities for humanitarian relief hope, as a result of early warning, to plan more 
effective operations to provide food and other necessities to persons displaced by the 
violence. Other organizations that focus on diplomatic or military initiatives hope to use early 
warning to preempt an outbreak of violence or its recurrence following a conflict by having 
more time to implement conflict prevention measures such as preventive diplomacy or 
preventive peacekeeping (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). 
There are two key facets to the conflict prevention problem. The first is acquiring the 
capability to achieve reliable and useable conflict early warning. The second is effectively 
making use of that capability, motivating the willingness within and among countries and 
international organizations to act early and expeditiously. This paper focuses on the capability 
facet. An exploration of the second, willingness facet can be found in Brecke (2000). 
This paper describes the state of the art regarding the two main elements of a conflict 
early warning capability: the data and the models. 
 
1. Conflict Early Warning Data 
 
At the risk of appearing to be a person who divides the world into pairs, I will make one 
more binary distinction. Data germane to conflict early warning can be divided into two 
types. The important distinction is not between quantitative and qualitative data, although that 
distinction exists. Rather, we need to distinguish between the data that will help us figure out 
                                                          
1 See,for example, Cahill (1966), Rupesinghe and Kuroda (1992), Andriole and Young (1977), Boutros-Ghali  
  (1992), Laurance (1990) and Snyder, Hermann, and Lasswell (1976). 
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the best early warning indicators and the data that is gathered to serve as those indicators. 
This is undoubtedly not a standard distinction, but the following paragraphs will make the 
case for this position. 
The road to a reliable early warning capability is highly unlikely to be a short and direct 
one, but it can probably be traversed. Raw data is not the answer. Even the relatively well-
funded State Failure Project (Esty, et al, 1995 and Esty, et al, 1999), which evaluated 600 
variables, could achieve only a two-thirds success rate in classifying whether a state failure 
would occur or not. That achievement is nontrivial, but it is not sufficient for the desired goal 
of a reliable early warning system.  
A more subtle approach that does not expect (or hope) to almost immediately find 
“smoking pistol” indicators will probably be required for a successful and reliable system. 
That approach entails following a cycle in which researchers collect and test data to evaluate 
different explanations or mechanisms for how violent conflicts erupt and from that develop 
superior explanations (theories). Those new or refined theories will call for the collection of 
new data—or at minimum a new combination of existing variables—and the cycle will repeat 
until explanations (theories) with useable predictive power emerge.  
At that point the new theories will point to the information that is most relevant to risk 
assessment and early warning, and that information will become the second type of data, the 
early warning indicators collected by governments and other organizations for the practical 
task of conflict early warning and prevention. 
This conclusion is probably not a popular one. Most, if not all, practitioners interested 
in conflict early warning want to know only the second type of data. Unfortunately, efforts to 
determine the best early warning indicators will be at best inefficient and at worst ineffective 
if there is no attempt to operate in the mode that goes back and forth between data and theory 
in the manner just described. 
If the reader accepts the argument that we need to first concentrate on the data for 
evaluation and testing of theories, the next step is to determine what those data are and should 
be. Dismayingly, even the primary data needed develop better theories are not as useable as 
we might expect or would like. The best data in terms of comprehensiveness, availability, and 
appropriateness to address theoretical questions, unfortunately, pertain to interstate conflicts 
and disputes (Jones, Bremer, and Singer, 1996). I say ‘unfortunately’ not because this family 
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of conflicts is not important to study. The problem is that at this time interstate conflicts are 
relatively rare compared to (primarily) intrastate conflicts, as can be seen in Figure 1, which 
portrays the number of violent conflicts for each decade of the 20th century that are primarily 
interstate conflicts as opposed to intrastate conflicts. 
 
FIGURE 1 
N u m b e r  o f  C o n flic ts  in  2 0 th  C e n tu ry
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While accumulation and refinement of our understanding of interstate wars and 
disputes is occurring (Vasquez, 1993; Geller and Singer, 1998), in no small part because of 
the improving data regarding wars and disputes and causal factors such as alliances and 
international system structure (Wilkenson, 1996; Wilkenson, 1999; Gibler, 1999), progress 
with respect to intrastate wars lags precisely because of the relative absence of analogous 
data. 
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Possibly the most fundamental shortcoming regarding data relevant to intrastate war is 
that there is at this time no even remotely comprehensive list of intrastate violent conflicts 
that is in a form both readily accessible and useable for data analysis, namely, in a computer 
data file. It is hard to imagine how we can find the causes of intrastate conflicts when we lack 
even a list of the conflicts for which we would like to find the causes.  
This absence of a useable list of conflicts borders on the mind-boggling. Finding the 
causes of conflicts and the early warning indicators requires working with a significant 
sample of conflicts. We will not find the causes using sample sizes of one or even a few. Only 
a large sample will give us the ability to confidently generalize from past cases to future pre-
conflict situations. 
It must be emphasized that the problem is not the absence of lists of conflicts. 
Appendix A contains a long list of lists. The problem is two-fold: each one of the lists in the 
appendix contains only a small subset of the total population of violent conflicts and very few 
of the lists of intrastate conflicts are in a form suitable for data analysis. The Correlates of 
War Civil Wars dataset is available and being updated, but it is limited to conflicts in which 
(essentially) at least 1000 fatalities have occurred, a design constraint that eliminates many 
conflicts and thus limits the range of conflicts for which causes can be identified. An on-
going project to build a Conflict Catalog will resolve this problem of limited, useable 
intrastate conflict datasets, but that effort is not yet complete (Brecke, 1999). 
A second, related shortcoming is that we do not have a sound categorization system for 
violent conflicts. At this time conflicts are categorized in terms of very general distinctions 
such as interstate versus civil war (Small and Singer, 1982) or are placed in essentially ad hoc 
categories such as ethnic conflicts or peasant revolts, terms, that while generally meaningful 
to most readers, are not precise in terms of the criteria for inclusion and are not clearly 
distinct from other terms such as ethno-political conflicts or peasant rebellions. Appendix B 
provides a sample of about 150 of these categories. An empirically-based categorization 
system is in the works, but its completion of necessity follows completion of the Conflict 
Catalog (Brecke, 1997). It is worth noting that a categorization of violent conflicts analogous 
to what is done in other sciences requires a large sample size and a significant number of 
variables in order to achieve stable categories, that is, categories that do not lose their validity 
because of a minor change in the data. 
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This emphasis on categorization is important because if we want to identify early 
warning indicators that can provide us a 6-12 months “heads-up” of a conflict eruption or 
escalation, we almost certainly need to think in terms of identifying appropriate indicators for 
particular types of violent conflict. The likelihood of finding early warning indicators for a 
specific type of conflict will almost certainly be easier than finding them for a broad range of 
conflicts. The variety of conditions that lead to ethnic conflict, for example, is almost 
certainly much wider than the conditions that lead to a conflict in which the major point of 
contention is control of the state and the primary identifying characteristic of the major 
protagonists is religion or a conflict in which the major point of contention is creation of a 
new state and the primary identifying characteristic is language. By narrowing the definitions 
(and thus instances) we can reduce the number of variables and have a better chance of 
identifying which possible early warning indicators correspond with—and better yet, 
precede—the outbreak of the particular type of conflict. 
The search for a unified theory of war, so to speak, one or a few indicators that point 
near-unerringly to a future conflict of any type, is way too premature. Our existing theory is 
nowhere near advanced enough to give us that capability. Even particle physicists, whose 
theory is advanced enough to give exquisitely precise predictions that can be tested to a level 
of detail several digits to the right of the decimal point, do not yet have a unified theory. Their 
theoretical endeavors over the last century has focused on making (theoretical) explanations 
for the different components of the physical world, such as leptons or the strong force, and 
then working their way towards a broader theory that combine the explanations for the 
components, such as the one that linked electro-magnetism and the weak force. 
This may be the problem of the State Failure project. State failure, as important as it is, 
may, like war, be too broad a phenomenon to explain and reliably predict at this time. The 
three variables identified as being closely associated with state failure: Infant mortality, trade 
openness, and level of democracy, will probably be components of some future theory that 
fully explains state failure, but the heterogeneity of the 127 (Phase II) cases, especially in 
terms of the types of conflicts they experienced, makes the three variables lowest common 
denominators that are not sufficient to explain specific instances of state failure. To support 
this contention, it is worth noting that the State Failure Task Force identified additional 
important indicators for specific types of conflict. Especially, ethnic conflict was (is) more 
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likely when a single ethnic group dominates the ruling elite as well as when there was a 
“youth bulge” in the population (Esty, et al, 1999, p. 51). 
If the reader accepts the argument that we should, at least for now, concentrate on 
explanations for different components of the social world, in this case, different types of 
violent conflict, then the emphasis should be on projects that focus on sets of seemingly 
similar conflicts. The following efforts to differing degrees adhere to that admonition and 
merit mention in addition to the State Failure Project noted earlier. 
For example, for his model of communal or ethnopolitical conflict, Gurr (1994) 
proposes 15 indicators grouped into background conditions, intervening conditions, response 
conditions, and an example list containing 9 accelerators. 
For genocides/politicides, Harff (1994) distinguishes between background conditions, 
intervening conditions, and accelerators (also called precipitating events).  Background 
conditions are further broken down into international and internal background conditions. She 
offers a list of 19 indicators. 
Fein (1994) for the most part agrees with Harff, but she has her own set of indicators 
pointing towards genocide/politicide. Her 18 indicators break down into three categories: 
Conditions from the past, recent background conditions, and precipitating events. 
For the much broader class of conflicts that cause humanitarian relief operations and 
refugee flows, Schmid and Jongman of the PIOOM program at Leiden University in the 
Netherlands have developed a list of 70 background conditions indicators and 118 situational 
circumstances indicators (Schmid, 1998). 
These are serious efforts. The problem is that there is no strong evidence that any of the 
indicators they propose are truly conflict early warning indicators. The first data task 
described above has been essentially bypassed in the quest for the second type of data. 
The essential argument is that we need to be patient and build a strong foundation to 
find the best early warning indicators. To accomplish that we need to tread the line between 
single case studies that fail to give us generalizability and (so-called) large-N quantitative 
studies that mix disparate phenomena (different types of violent conflict) together in order to 
get sufficient sample sizes for statistical power. The Conflict Catalog and the subsequent 
conflict categorization projects seek to give us the data such that we have sizeable samples 
with specific types of conflict, but that, again, is in the future. We need to start from basic 
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information and build our theories from there. The benefit of taking such a path is that it will 
enable us to much more effectively leverage the other data, such as that for the State Failure 
Project, that has already been collected. 
 
2. Conflict Early Warning Models  
The reader may accept the plausibility of the need to first collect data to resolve 
between different theoretical explanations for the outbreak of violent conflicts as opposed to 
rather blindly collecting early warning indicators, but that does not answer the question of 
what data (beyond very basic data) should be collected for the first step. The answer to that 
question forces us to examine the models being used to determine the most appropriate 
theories. 
To reduce ambiguity, in this paper a theory is an explanation of a phenomenon (or set 
of phenomena) whereby the explanation describes a process or mechanism through which the 
phenomenon occurs or changes. For our purposes an appropriate theory describes a process 
by which a violent conflict erupts or an already conflictual situation transitions to a higher 
level of violence. It describes how the appearance of or change of some thing or things causes 
a conflict to erupt or escalate. A model is a representation of the phenomenon that articulates 
or brings together in a relatively concise and comprehensible way the components of a theory. 
A theory can be represented by a number of models, each typically providing a particular 
perspective on the phenomenon. Confusingly, a model can, in turn, represent a number of 
theories. There is not necessarily a one-to-one relationship. In this instance, the usual and 
preferred action is to apply data against the model to see which theories embodied in the 
model best fit or correspond to the data. 
This multiplicity in the ways that phenomena, theories, and models interact makes it 
difficult to establish a coherent schema for organizing models. While we might wish for 
simplicity’s sake that models corresponded on a one-to-one basis with theories, the fact that 
they do not forces us to use different organizing principles. Two such organizing principles 
are: 
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• To categorize models by the phenomena they represent 
•  To categorize models by the methodologies employed to apply data to the model 
For this paper we will focus mainly on models germane to intrastate conflict. 
One attempt to organize models relevant to conflict early warning was done by Gurr 
and Harff (1994). They categorized models into the three following types: 
• Correlational Models 
• Sequential Models 
• Conjunctural Models 
This breakdown corresponds quite closely to different methodologies. 
 
2.1 Correlational Models 
The Correlational Model approach has seen wide application in determining the causes 
of war, particularly interstate wars, and progress has been made (Geller and Singer, 1998). 
The approach is based on the assumption that certain indicators or measures of the political, 
economic, and social situation in a country covary with a measure of the level of violence in 
that country.2 One tries to find out how much they covary by putting them in a multiple 
regression (or a logit analysis) equation. On the right-hand-side of the equation exists a 
(sometimes very large) number of factors (indicators) believed to contribute to the likelihood 
of whether a situation will become a violent conflict or not in the not-too-distant future. On 
the left-hand-side is the outcome indicator with values such as conflict or no conflict or close 
to a conflict or possibly some more precise measure of the level of violence. The goal is to 
find the influence or weight that each factor has on the outcome. Those factors that turn out to 
“weigh heavily” on the outcome become key components of a correlational model of the 
outbreak of violent conflict.  
Inspection of the correlational model approach reveals that it possesses two distinct 
facets. The first is to develop and validate a correlational model that corresponds to a 
particular theory (Gurr and Moore, 1997). This involves using data from the past to find the 
                                                          
2 One can go further and argue on theoretical grounds that the variables represented by those indicators of the  
  situation cause the level of violence, but that is not strictly necessary for obtaining conflict alerts. 
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relationship between each factor and the outcome.3 The second facet entails assuming that the 
correlational model is reasonably correct and robust and then supplying current values to each 
of the factors of the regression equation (Gurr, 1998). (In effect the equation(s) describing the 
model changes its (their) nature from stochastic to deterministic.) If the values of those 
factors (the terms on the right-hand-side of the equation) reach values such that the calculated 
value of the outcome (the left-hand-side of the equation) corresponds to a violent conflict, 
there then exists a reasonable basis for a conflict alert.  
These two facets of the correlational model illustrate and parallel the distinction made 
earlier between the data needed to determine the appropriate early warning indicators and the 
data needed for early warning activities in an organization. Onishi (1998) describes the use of 
both facets of a correlational model approach to achieve an early warning of displaced 
persons. 
 
2.2 Sequential Models 
The Sequential Model approach is a very different method for achieving conflict alerts. 
Rather than describing a causal structure that involves some number of independent variables 
pointing to a dependent variable such as the likelihood that a conflict will erupt, as is done 
with a correlational model, a sequential model consists of a “mechanism” that describes how 
changes in an environment bring about a specific event (or events) or a change in some 
specified variable. For example, whereas a(n extremely simplistic) correlational model might 
represent the theoretical argument that the level of violence in a society is a function of the 
degree of wealth inequality and the unemployment rate, a similarly simplistic sequential 
model might be expressed as: If the unemployment rate in a society is rising, the level of 
discontent among the workers will rise. If the level of discontent is at a high level and the 
government drastically raises the price of bread, then violence is likely to erupt. 
The element of time is much more integral, much more explicit in the “explanation” of 
how a conflict comes about. 
Events fit more easily within a sequential model than they do in a correlational model. 
Events typically trigger changes in a sequential model. They can cause relationships between 
                                                          
3 Typically the concern is the weight or strength of the relationship, but the nature or the functional form of the  
  relationship can be ascertained as well.  
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different elements of the model to become either active or inactive. Alternatively, they can 
cause a change in the tempo or dynamic of a relationship. For example, two groups in a 
society may coexist with some tension but essentially peaceably. If members of one of the 
groups begin to verbally attack the other group, accusing them of being the cause of increased 
crime, for example, that event or series of events is likely to increase the tensions between the 
groups, probably inciting increased verbal and written exchanges of both a provocative and 
conciliatory nature by different individuals in the groups. At another level, if there is an 
incident in which members of one of the groups attack and kill members of the other group, 
this event is likely to provoke retaliation by the second group, which establishes a 
relationship of violent exchanges that did not exist before. 
Harff (1994) describes a sequential model that incorporates this general concept with 
respect to genocide and politicide: one looks for accelerators, events that, when they occur, 
tend to lead to a cascade of events resulting in a genocide/politicide (with politicide defined 
by Harff as situations in which groups are victimized primarily because of their political 
opposition to the ruling regime instead of their communal characteristics such as ethnicity or 
religion). 
A sequential model represents a theory. Both describe a process to explain how a 
change in some thing leads to a change in the object of interest, in our case violent conflicts. 
This is another way in which sequential models differ from correlational models. A sequential 
model has a one-to-one correspondence with a theory. To make a sequential model, one must 
have a theory in mind. In fact, the act of making the model forces an explicit articulation of a 
theory. Correlational models, in contrast, typically have a one-to-many relationship with 
theories. One model can, in principle, support a number of different theories. The data that 
are applied to a correlational model determine which particular theory it supports. 
If one considers a sequential model in terms of what it is doing, it is clear that an 
appropriate methodological or analytical approach is to implement it in a computer 
simulation. A computer simulation model almost by definition represents a process that 
unfolds through a sequence of steps, usually over time. As such, a computer simulation 
directly corresponds to a sequential model. The unique feature of computer simulations is that 
they step through the sequence of steps in an accelerated manner inside the computer. The 
result is that in a simulation, one year in the “real world” transpires in something much less, 
perhaps one minute or a few seconds. It is through this accelerated movement through time 
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that a sequential model implemented in a computer can provide an early warning of violent 
conflicts. As the model simulates the situation between or within countries, the model can, in 
effect, get to the future before the “real world” gets there. 
Thus, a sequential model implemented in a computer simulation could be used to 
provide conflict alerts in the following way: As in any formalized conflict alert system, 
information from current news feeds and new publications is processed and entered into a 
database subsystem, probably on a daily if not continuous basis. The Kansas Event Data 
System (KEDS) and the new Integrated Data For Events Analysis (IDEA) system provide the 
core capability for this task (Gerner and Schrodt, 1996; Taylor, Jenkins, and Bond, 1999). 
From the database the conflict early warning system extracts or calculates the indicators 
which serve as inputs for the simulation. These inputs become the initial values for the 
variables within the model, and as such serve as starting points for the simulation model’s 
calculations. The model is then run in order to simulate the country or countries it represents. 
If the simulation run, given new input data that arrived since the last run (perhaps on the 
previous day), results in a conflict that did not occur in previous simulations, it is providing a 
conflict alert. 
Unfortunately, to this writer’s knowledge there are no computer simulations that 
represent sequential models of the outbreak of violent conflict. A partial exception to this 
assertion is various strategy-oriented computer games such as Civilization, Imperialism, and 
Age of Empires. In these games a player can end up involved in wars, but the reason these 
simulations are not really useful for the purpose of conflict early warning is that the 
sequential models implicitly built into the games are simply the game designers’ personal 
mental models of how wars come about. Those models may be very good, but they lack the 
solid theoretical and empirical foundation that is essential for a credible conflict early 
warning system. The problem remains, as before, an absence of good theories explaining the 
processes by which different types of violent conflict erupt. 
An alternative approach to sequential models can be found in the PARISinLA project 
(Adibi, Alker, Malita, and Vest, 1997). This project emphasizes analysis of the history of 
discussion or debate between actors as well as their actions, and it employs sophisticated 
software to analyze those histories as they are embodied in textual descriptions. The 
PARISinLA project also makes use of data sets that contain the histories of cases involving 
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conflict management, most notably CASCON and SHERFACS, and thus are well-suited to 
this type of historical and textual analysis. This is work in progress. 
 
2.3 Conjunctural Models 
The Conjunctural Model approach focuses on combinations of conditions and events 
that lead to violent conflicts. The underlying premise is that different combinations of a 
country’s circumstances lead to different outcomes. For instance, some situations lead to 
violence in the form of a guerrilla war against the government, while others lead to an inter-
ethnic group conflict, while yet others do not lead to violence at all. Schock (1996) presents a 
weak form of a conjunctural model that explores whether political context moderates the 
influence of economic inequality on political conflict. Stronger forms of a conjunctural model 
are possible that allow for the exploration of a large variety of combinations or conjunctures 
that lead to violent conflict. 
Conjunctural models may possess an advantage over correlational models with respect 
to both finding causes for violent conflicts and in an operational conflict early warning role. 
The problem for correlational models may be the assumptions behind them. One of the 
assumptions with correlational models is that they start from the premise that the explanatory 
variables covary with the output or dependent variable. In addition, correlational models 
typically assume that the explanatory variables do not covary with each other as they covary 
with the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are supposed to be independent from 
each other. If the explanatory variables covary with each other quite closely, a problem of 
multicollinearity emerges, and as any introductory statistics text explains, multicollinearity 
makes it effectively impossible to ascertain the precise relationship between the explanatory 
and dependent variables (Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1977). 
It may be the case that neither of these two assumptions holds true with respect to 
violent conflicts and especially the conflict early warning task, making the correlational 
model approach unsuitable.  The key feature of the relationship between early warning 
indicators and violent conflict may not be how they covary; it may be the occurrence of a 
particular combination or configuration of them at some point in time before the conflict 
erupts. Moreover, the notion of independence of the explanatory variables (early warning 
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indicators) may be inappropriate because it may be their interaction that is important.  For 
these reasons, conjunctural models deserve greater attention. 
The conjunctural approach can be quite easily understood if the reader envisions it as a 
pattern recognition task.  This results in an analytical approach that emulates what a typical 
international affairs or country expert appears to do.  To illustrate, consider the following.  
When such an expert focuses her or his attention upon a country to decide whether it is likely 
to experience political violence and then makes a determination, that individual has in all 
likelihood used pattern recognition. More specifically, the individual examines the country’s 
situation, which includes both its history and its current condition, in terms of both events and 
variables describing underlying processes. The individual (consciously or not) compares the 
situation with other countries’ situations, both current and in the past, to find analogues. The 
individual can find an analogue through two paths. First, the other case (or cases) can be 
empirically almost identical, a parallel case. In international affairs so much variation in 
country descriptions exists that such an outcome is unlikely. The second path is that the other 
case (or cases) can be sufficiently similar such that given the analyst’s theoretical (mental) 
model of how the “world” works, the analyst judges the cases to be analogous. Deviations—
even significant deviations—in the cases are possible, but if those aspects of the situation as 
determined by the theoretical or mental model to be important to the countries’ dynamics are 
the same, then the cases are believed to be analogues. If the analogous case or cases 
subsequently evolved to violent conflicts, then the analyst is likely to believe that the 
particular country of interest is also likely to suffer a conflict. 
Brecke (1998) describes how to transform situations within or between countries into 
patterns that can be analyzed in a manner analogous to that described in the previous 
paragraph. The situation at a particular place at a particular point in time is summarized as 
one grid pattern. The history of a particular place is summarized in a sequence of grid 
patterns. Each grid pattern is conjunctural in that it depicts the combination of characteristics 
(or variables) that describe the situation. 
The key to this approach is to use pattern recognition techniques to identify particular 
grid patterns, configurations of conditions that consistently precede the outbreak of violent 
conflicts and that also do not occur in places that do not experience violent conflict. There are 
a number of possible pattern recognition techniques that can be used. Schrodt has explored 
the use of factor analysis, discriminant analysis, cluster analysis, genetic algorithms, neural 
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networks, and most recently, hidden Markov models to identify early warning indicators with 
modest success (Schrodt and Gerner, 1996; Schrodt and Gerner, 1997; Schrodt and Gerner, 
1998; Schrodt, 1991; and Schrodt, forthcoming). The State Failure Project has applied neural 
network analysis to the data they have collected, and the United Nations Humanitarian Early 
Warning System project (HEWS) tried using neural network analysis to their own data as 
well (Esby, et. Al. 1999; Ahmed and Kassinis, 1998). What has not yet been done is to apply 




Progress in terms of data and models in support of risk assessment models for conflict 
early warning and prevention is occurring, but progress is slow. A significant amount of even 
basic data about conflicts remains to be collected and analyzed. However, those data may 
enable us to make better use of the considerable data already collected and assembled. More 
effort should be placed on collecting data about conflicts as opposed to data about the 
countries that have experienced or are experiencing violent conflict. 
Modeling work that may provide guidance regarding what other data to collect and, 
ultimately more importantly, provide reliable risk assessment models is also making only 
limited progress. Part of the problem is that most model developers are hamstrung by limited 
resources relative to the magnitude of the problem. A bigger problem, as outlined above, is 
the lack of theory—supported by data—that can guide the design of a reliable risk assessment 
model. Rather than going directly for an operational risk assessment model, more effort 
should be placed on modeling and data work to support the development of better theory to 
explain the outbreak of different types of violent conflict. 
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Compilations of Violent Conflicts 
 
Dictionaries or Encyclopedias of Wars and Battles 
 
Brownstone, David F. and Irene Franck. Timelines of War: A Chronology of Warfare from 
100,000 B.C to the Present. New York: Little, Brown & Company. 1996. 
 
Bruce, George. Collins Dictionary of Wars. Glasgow: Harper Collins. 1995. 
(this was formerly Harbottle’s Dictionary of Battles, 1966, 1971, 1981 and The Paladin 
Dictionary of Battles, 1986.) 
 
Chandler, David. Dictionary of Battles: the world’s key battles from 405 BC to today. New 
York: Random House. 1991. 
 
Clodfelter, Micheal. Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and 
Other Figures, 1618-1991. Vols. 1 and 2. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 
Inc. 1992. 
 
Davis, Paul K. Encyclopedia of Invasions and Conquests: from Ancient Times to the Present. 
Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio. 1996. 
 
Dupuy, Trevor N., and R. Ernest Dupuy. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History from 
3500 B.C. to the present. 4th edition. New York: Harper & Row. 1993. 
 
Eggenberger, David. An Encyclopedia of Battles: accounts of over 1,560 battles from 1479 
B.C. to the present. New York: Dover. 1985. 
(this was formerly A Dictionary of Battles, 1967) 
 
Gallay, Allan. Colonial Wars of North America: an encyclopedia, Military History of the 
United States series, Vol. No. 5. New York: Garland, 1996. 
 
Goldstein, Erik. Wars and Peace Treaties: 1816-1991. New York: Routledge. 1992. 
 
Hogg, Ian. V. Battles: A concise dictionary. New York: Harcourt Brace. 1995. 
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Kaye, G.D., D.A. Grant, and E.J. Emond. Major Armed Conflict: A Compendium of 
Interstate and Intrastate Conflict, 1720-1985. ORAE Report No. R 95. Operational Research 
and Analysis Establishment. Department of National Defence. Ottawa, Canada. 1985. 
 
Keenan, Jerry. Encyclopedia of American Indian Wars: 1492-1890. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-
Clio. 1997. 
 
Kohn, George C. Dictionary of Wars. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1987. 
 
Laffin, John. Brassey’s Battles: 3,500 years of conflict, campaigns, and 
wars from A-Z. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986. 
 
Sweetman, John. A Dictionary of European Land Battles:  from the Earliest Times to 1945. 
New York: MacMillan Publishing Company. 1985. 
 
Van Creveld, Martin. The Encyclopedia of Revolutions and Revolutionaries : from anarchism 
to Zhou Enlai. New York: Facts on File. 1996. 
 
Young, Brigadier Peter, with Brigadier Michael Calvert. A Dictionary of Battles 1715-1815. 
Vol. 3. New York: Mayflower Books, 1979. 
 
Young, Brigadier Peter, with Brigadier Michael Calvert. Dictionary of Battles 1816-1976. 
Vol. 4. New York: Mayflower Books. 1978. 
 
 
Academic Research Works Containing Compilations 
 
Bodart, Gaston. Losses of Life in Modern Wars: Austria-Hungary; France. Oxford: At the 
Clarendon Press. 1916. 
 
Bouthoul, Gaston, and Rene Carrere. “A List of the 366 Major Armed Conflicts of the Period 
1740-1974,” Peace Research. Vol. 10, Number 3 (July 1978). pp. 83-108. 
 
Dumas, Samuel, and K. O. Vedel-Petersen. Losses of Life Caused by War. Oxford: At the 
Clarendon Press. 1923. 
 
Farwell, Byron. Queen Victoria’s Little Wars. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1972. 
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Hassig, Ross. Aztec Warfare: Imperial Expansion and Political Control. Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press. 1988. 
 
Holsti, Kalevi. J. Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1991. 
 
Holsti, Kalevi J. The State, War, and the State of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 1996. 
 
Jongman, Albert J. (Ed.). Contemporary Genocides: Causes, Cases, Consequences. Leiden, 
Netherlands: PIOOM. 1996. 
 
Kende, Istvan, “Wars from 1965 to 1978,” Peace Research. Vol. 11, Number 4 (October 
1979). pp. 197-199. 
 
Kiser, Edgar, Kriss A. Drass, and William Brustein. “The Relationship Between Revolt and 
War in Early Modern Western Europe,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology. Vol. 22, 
No. 2 (Winter 1994). pp. 305-324. 
 
Levy, Jack S. War in the Modern Great Power System, 1945-1975. Lexington, KT: the 
University Press of Kentucky. 1983. 
 
Luard, Evan. War in International Society: A Study in International Sociology. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 1987. 
 
Richardson, Lewis F. Statistics of Deadly Quarrels. Pittsburgh: The Boxwood Press. 1960. 
 
Rummel, R. J. Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder since 1917. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 1990. 
 
Rummel, R. J. China’s Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 1991. 
 
Rummel, R. J. Democide: Nazi Genocide and Mass Murder. New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers. 1992. 
 
Rummel, R. J. Death by Government. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 1994. 
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Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer. Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-
1980. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 1982. 
 
Sorokin, Pitirim A. Social and Cultural Dynamics: Volume 3: Fluctuation of Social 
Relationships, War, and Revolution. New York: American Book Company. 1937. 
 
Sutton, Antony. The State, War, and Revolution. (Unpublished manuscript). Probably 1972. 
 
Sutton, Antony. Wars and Revolutions in the Nineteenth Century. (Unpublished manuscript). 
1972. 
 
Urlanis, B. Wars and Population of Europe: human losses of the armed forces of the 
European countries in the XVII-XX century wars. Moscow: Progress Publications. 1960. 
 
Woods, Frederick Adams, and Alexander Baltzly. Is War Diminishing? A Study of the 
Prevalence of War in Europe from 1450 to the Present Day. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company. 1915. 
 




Historical Chronologies and Historical Atlases 
 
Ajaye, J. F. Ade, and Michael Crowder (general eds.). Historical Atlas of Africa. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
 
Axelrod, Alan. Chronicle of the Indian Wars: From Colonial Times to Wounded Knee. New 
York: Konechy & Konecky. 1993. 
 
Channon, John, with Robert Hudson. The Penguin Historical Atlas of Russia. London: 
Penguin Books. 1995. 
 
Freeman-Grenville, G.S.P. Chronology of African History. London: Oxford University Press, 
1973. 
 
Freeman-Grenville, G.S.P. Chronology of World History: a calender of principal events from 
3000 B.C. To A.D. 1973. London: Rex Collings, 1975. 
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Freeman-Grenville, G.S.P. Historical Atlas of the Middle East. New York: Simon Shuster, 
1993. 
 
Gilbert, Martin. Atlas of Russian History. New York: Dorset Press. 1985. 
 
Grant, Neil. Chronicle of 20th Century Conflict. New York: Smithmark Publishers. 1993. 
 
Marley, David F. Wars of the Americas: A Chronology of Armed Conflict in the New World, 
1492 to the Present. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. 1998. 
 
McEvedy, Colin. The Penguin Atlas of African History. London: Penguin Books. 1995. 
 
Natkiel, Richard, and John Pimlott. Atlas of Warfare. New York: Gallery Books. 1988. 
 
Pluvier, Jan M. Historical Atlas of South-East Asia. New York: E.J. Brill, 1995. 
 
Schwartzberg, Joseph E. (Ed.). A Historical Atlas of South Asia. 2nd impression with 
additional material. New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. 
 
Wilgus, A. Curtis. Historical Atlas of Latin America: political, geographic, economic, 
cultural. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1967. 
 
 
Works Not in the English Language 
 
History of Wars in China. (Zhongguo lidai zhanzheng shi).  Vols. 14-18. Taipei, Taiwan: 
United Military University of Taiwan. 1972. (in Chinese) 
 
Military History of China: Appendix: Chronicle of Wars in Sui and Tang Dynasties (v.2). 
(Zhongguo junshi shi). Military History of China Team. Beijing: Peoples Liberation Army 
Press. 1986. (in Chinese) 
 
Encyclopedia of Wars and Battles in and Outside of China.  (Zhongwai zhanzheng zhanyi 
dacidian). Changsha, Hunan, PRC: Hunan Press. 1992. (in Chinese) 
 
Dictionary of Wars and Battles. (Zhongwai zhan dian). Beijing: Central National University 
Press.1993. (in Chinese) 
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Wars & Incidents: Survey of All Wars, Coup D’etats, and Incidents. (Sensou•Jihen: 
Zensensou•Kuu Te Taa•Jihen Souran). Edited revised edition. Tokyo: Kyouikusha. 1993. (in 
Japanese) 
 
Notohisa, Yashida, (Ed.). Small Encyclopedic Overview of Japanese Wars. (Nihonshi 
Syohyaka•Senran). Tokyo: Konto. 1984. (in Japanese) 
 
Bodart, Gaston. Lexicon of War and Military History (1618-1905). (Militaer-historisches 
Kriegs-Lexicon). Vienna: C. W. Stern. 1908. (in German) 
 
Bouthoul, Gaston, and Rene Carrere. The Challenge of War,1740-1974. (Le defi de la 
guerre). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1976. (in French) 
 
Latsinsky, A. S. (Ed.) Chronology of the Global History of Wars with reference to the major 
facts of socio-political and cultural history, 4400 BC - 1900 AD.  St. Petersburg: Military 
Printing House. 1901. (in Russian) 
 
Shavrov, I. E. (Ed.). Local Wars: History and Modern Times. Moscow: Military Publishing 





SIPRI. SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1968/69. New York: 
Humanities Press. 1969. 
 
SIPRI. SIPRI Yearbook: World Armaments and Disarmament. New York: Humanities Press. 
1986 to 1993 editions. 
 
SIPRI. SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. New York: 
Humanities Press. 1994 to 1996 editions. 
 
Sivard, Ruth Leger. World Military and Social Expenditures. Leesburg, VA: WMSE 
Publications. 1985, 1987-88, 1991, 1993, 1996 editions. 
 
Wallensteen, Peter, and Karin Axell. “Armed Conflict at the End of the Cold War, 1989-92,” 
Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 30, No. 3. 1993. pp. 331-346. 
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Wallensteen, Peter, and Margareta Sollenberg. “After the Cold War: Emerging Patterns of 
Armed Conflict 1989-94,” Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 32, No. 3. 1995. pp. 345-360. 
  
Wallensteen, Peter, and Margareta Sollenberg. “The End of International War? Armed 
Conflict 1989-95,” Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 33, No. 3. 1996. pp. 353-370. 
 
Wallensteen, Peter, and Margareta Sollenberg. “Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and 
Peace Agreements, 1989-96,” Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 34, No. 3. 1997. pp. 339-358. 
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environmental conflict 
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- resource conflict 
- pollution/emissions conflict 
 
Borderline Violent Conflict 
incident 
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